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hMailServer 6.3.8 is the current release, signed 2 November 2026. Windows and Linux, and an in-place upgrade from 5.3 or later, but for the original hMailServer's 5.7.Download 6.3.8 Documentation FAQ

Automation & integration

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Driving hMailServer from outside the Control Panel: scripts, the COM and REST APIs, Sieve and rules, and metrics and logs shipped elsewhere.

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  • VBScript and JScript event handlers on Windows, JavaScript ones on Linux since 6.3.4, OnAcceptMessage and friends, and the COM API and the Import Tool, which are Windows only. Paste the script and the error it raised.

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    ProgressiverobotP
    Written for 6.3.4. hMailServer 6.3.7 (17 October 2026) confines an account given the serveradmin role with a list of domains to those domains over COM as over REST, so it is no longer the server's administrator: give the role with no list to an account that is to administer the whole server, a script's or a Control Panel's account among them. Over COM, one given domainadmin with a list that leaves out its own domain no longer administers that domain's ordinary accounts; 6.3.4 to 6.3.6 allowed both where REST refused them. A role is given or taken away only by a credential that holds manage_roles in the account's domain and takes in what the account holds now and afterwards, and a credential confined to named domains is refused over COM, as over REST, a domain's rename, a domain alias, a relay host changed to an address that is not public and an action on a domain's or an account's rule that reaches one of the server's own addresses, a configured route or a function of the event script. Rule.Save and RuleAction.Save refuse, on a domain's or an account's rule, a Set header value of From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender or DKIM-Signature and a Reply from an address the owner may not send as, and on a rule of every owner a Set header value of the loop count; one stored before the upgrade is taken without that action, and the application log names it. For a rule of every owner they refuse a Run function that is not a plain function, which one stored before still meets when the rule fires, as since 6.3.4. Utilities.CheckSieveSyntax refuses a Sieve script that adds or deletes From, Sender, Resent-From, Resent-Sender, DKIM-Signature, Auto-Submitted or the loop count. Once the database has ended a Database object's transaction, every later statement is refused and Database.CommitTransaction fails: call Database.RollbackTransaction and run the whole transaction again, or stop. See the 6.3.7 announcement. hMailServer 6.3.8 (2 November 2026) signs a name in over COM, as at every other sign-in, only when it is the account's stored address, compared in lower case after a domain alias and the default domain: a mailbox address spelt otherwise, in more than the case of the letters A to Z, or with white space at either end, may no longer sign in; it fails as a name that does not exist fails, and is counted as a failure. See the 6.3.8 announcement. This topic covers the COM API of hMailServer 6.3.4: what a script connects to and how it authenticates, the object model and the shape every collection shares, working PowerShell examples, the change 6.3.4 makes to when a configuration change takes effect, what 6.3.4 adds to the object model, administrator roles over COM and why API keys are not there, the changed-from-stock document, the COM surfaces of distribution lists and the directory, and the Import Tool. The one thing to know first is that the COM API is Windows-only, and that an object you add to a collection, or an item of one you change, is not stored until you call its Save(); a few writes need none, among them an account's SieveScript and Settings.SetIniSetting, and an address saved or deleted through Route.Addresses needs no Save() of the route. Since 6.3.4 the running server's routes, relays and other shared configuration objects also wait for that Save(); up to 6.3.3 they changed the moment a property was set. What you are connecting to hMailServer exposes a full COM API. Almost anything the Control Panel can do, a script can do, because the Control Panel does its work through COM. The exceptions are the pages that edit a file on the server itself: REST API keys (described under roles below), the two directory pages' [LDAP] section, the sending limits on Server limits & expert settings, the [Database] rows of the Performance page, and the event script; and Discovery, which reads the REST listener because eDiscovery has no COM interface. The COM API and the Control Panel are both Windows-only: a Linux server is administered over REST, hmctl and the Control Deck (hMailServer on Linux: what you get and what you do not). One type library, hMailServer, with 94 coclasses in 6.3.3 and 100 in 6.3.4. The root is Application, ProgID hMailServer.Application. Every interface is a dual IDispatch interface, so late binding works without registering the type library. CreateObject, New-Object -ComObject and C# dynamic all work on a machine where only the server is installed. Early binding depends on vtable order, so new members are always appended, never inserted. An interop assembly built against 6.3.3 keeps working; recompile it to reach the new members, and on a hand-copied installation register the server again, elevated, so that the new interfaces are known to COM. Late-bound scripts need nothing. The installer's admintools component exists only to register the type library, so that scripts on another machine can administer this one. # Local $app = New-Object -ComObject 'hMailServer.Application' # Remote, over DCOM, against a machine where admintools is registered $app = [Activator]::CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromProgID('hMailServer.Application', 'mail01')) Authenticating $app = New-Object -ComObject 'hMailServer.Application' $account = $app.Authenticate('Administrator', 'your-admin-password') if (-not $account) { throw 'Authentication failed.' } Authenticate returns an Account object, or $null on failure. Sign in as Gets Administrator with [Security] AdministratorPassword from hMailServer.INI server administrator A mailbox address whose AdminLevel is 2 server administrator A mailbox address whose AdminLevel is 1 domain administrator: their own domain only A mailbox address that holds a role (since 6.3.4) what the role's permissions reach, in the domains it reaches An empty administrator password is an open door. If the administrator password is empty, and no administrator TOTP secret is enrolled, every COM session starts already authenticated as a server administrator. This is the historical behaviour. A second factor changes the call you must make. With Settings.EnrolAdministratorTOTP() used, Authenticate refuses the administrator outright and AuthenticateWithCode is the only way in: if ($app.AdministratorTOTPEnabled) { # readable BEFORE authenticating $app.AuthenticateWithCode('Administrator', $password, $code) | Out-Null } else { $app.Authenticate('Administrator', $password) | Out-Null } Three things about that sign-in change in 6.3.4: Change, since 6.3.4 What a script sees A one-time code is taken once a TOTP code the server has accepted is refused if it comes again, for the administrator and for an account alike; the refusal is not counted as a wrong code A wrong code is counted AuthenticateWithCode checks the password first, and a wrong code after a right password counts against a budget of five in fifteen minutes, then no code is taken for fifteen An app password is not a COM logon Authenticate and AuthenticateWithCode answer an app password as they answer a wrong password; it still opens the mailbox over IMAP, POP3 and SMTP How a refusal reaches you. If you are not entitled to an object, every member returns an error HRESULT: a terminating exception in PowerShell, a trappable error in VBScript, a COMException in C#. Up to 6.3.3, seventy-two COM classes answered a refusal as a bare Exception from HRESULT: 0x800403E9. Since 6.3.4 a refusal arrives with the server's own sentence. The object model From Application What is there Domains Domain, and under each Accounts, Aliases, DistributionLists, DomainAliases and, since 6.3.4, Rules Account (under Accounts) Address, Password, Active, MaxSize, Size, AdminLevel; Messages, IMAPFolders, Rules, FetchAccounts, AppPasswords; SieveScript, TOTPEnabled Settings the server-wide properties and the sub-objects AntiSpam (which owns Quarantine), AntiVirus, Backup, Cache, Directories, Groups, IncomingRelays, Logging, MessageIndexing, PublicFolders, Routes, Scripting, SecurityRanges, ServerMessages, SSLCertificates, TCPIPPorts; since 6.3.4, RemoteDomainPolicies Rules the global rules Status UndeliveredMessages, StartTime, ProcessedMessages, RemovedViruses, RemovedSpamMessages, SessionCount Utilities helpers such as CheckSieveSyntax, CriteriaMatch, MakeDependent, PerformMaintenance, ImportMessageFromFileToIMAPFolder Database ExecuteSQL, ExecuteSQLWithReturn, RequiresUpgrade, IsConnected, DatabaseType BackupManager StartBackup, LoadBackup GlobalObjects DeliveryQueue, MessageTrace, Languages Links Domain(DBID), Account(DBID), Alias(DBID), DistributionList(DBID) Diagnostics DiagnosticResults, each a DiagnosticResult Every collection offers the same shape: Count, Item(index), ItemByDBID(id), Add(), Refresh(), Delete(index) and DeleteByDBID(id), with ItemByName or ItemByAddress where a name exists. Items have Save() and Delete(). Add() does not persist. It returns a new, unsaved object. Set the properties, then call Save(). A script that forgets Save() looks as though it worked and changes nothing. In PowerShell, keep the object in a variable rather than chaining. Working examples $app = New-Object -ComObject 'hMailServer.Application' $app.Authenticate('Administrator', 'your-admin-password') | Out-Null # Add a domain $domain = $app.Domains.Add() $domain.Name = 'example.com' $domain.Active = $true $domain.Save() # Add an account $account = $domain.Accounts.Add() $account.Address = '[email protected]' $account.Password = 'a-strong-password' $account.Active = $true $account.MaxSize = 1000 # MB, 0 = unlimited $account.Save() # Report on every mailbox foreach ($d in $app.Domains) { foreach ($a in $d.Accounts) { '{0,-40} {1,8} MB used' -f $a.Address, [math]::Round($a.Size, 1) # Size is already in MB } } Three units, three objects. Account.Size is megabytes. Dividing it by 1MB again, which older examples do, prints 0 for every mailbox. Message.Size is kilobytes, and the Message size rule criterion is bytes. Find one account without walking every domain: $domain = $app.Domains.ItemByName('example.com') $account = $domain.Accounts.ItemByAddress('[email protected]') Send a message from a script. Message is a creatable coclass in its own right, and Save() on a new one queues it for delivery: $m = New-Object -ComObject 'hMailServer.Message' $m.FromAddress = '[email protected]' $m.From = 'Postmaster <[email protected]>' $m.AddRecipient('Alice', '[email protected]') $m.Subject = 'Scheduled maintenance tonight' $m.Body = 'The server will restart at 22:00.' $m.Save() The queue, and a backup: $app.Status.UndeliveredMessages # tab-separated text, one row per message $app.GlobalObjects.DeliveryQueue.ResetDeliveryTime() $app.GlobalObjects.DeliveryQueue.StartDelivery() $b = $app.Settings.Backup $b.BackupDomains = $true; $b.BackupSettings = $true; $b.BackupMessages = $true $b.Destination = 'D:\backups' $app.BackupManager.StartBackup() The [Settings] keys are reachable generically: $app.Settings.IniSettingNames # every key the server knows $app.Settings.GetIniSetting('ManageSieveServerPort') $app.Settings.SetIniSetting('ManageSieveServerPort', '4190') Up to 6.3.3 a change this way usually needed a restart. Since 6.3.4 the keys are kept in the database, and Settings.IniSettingApplies(name) says whether a save applies a key at once, at a reinitialise or at a restart; Settings.PendingIniSettings lists the saved ones the server does not run on yet. Settings: when a save takes effect, and the three levels has the counts and what becomes of the file's copy. What changed in 6.3.4: a shared object takes effect at Save() Some collections are not loaded for your COM session alone: the running server reads the very same items while it works. They are the routes and their addresses, the incoming relays, the DNS black lists, the SURBL servers, the remote domain policies, the server messages, the blocked attachments, the SSL certificates and the groups. Up to 6.3.3, setting a property on one of those items wrote the live object every SMTP, IMAP and delivery thread was reading, which let a session read a string while it was being freed. Since 6.3.4: The first property you set makes a copy, held by your COM object, and every later set writes the copy. Reading a property back from the same object reads what you set. Nothing is in effect until Save(). Save() writes the copy to the database and the server reads the collection again. A property set and never saved changes nothing at all. Up to 6.3.3 it changed the running server until the next restart while the database kept the old value. A script that relied on that must now call Save(). An object read before the save keeps what it read. After a Save(), read the item again from its collection (ItemByDBID, ItemByName) to see the saved values. A route's addresses. A change to an existing address waits for that address's Save(), like every item here. An address saved or deleted through Route.Addresses reaches the running route at once, without the route's own Save(), as it always did. A RouteAddresses list read before the route's save is the old route's list, though an address saved or deleted through it still reaches the running route. A save the database refuses leaves the running item as it was, and your object keeps the refused values, to be corrected and saved again. A remote domain policy is the exception: it is read back as the database holds it. A save whose re-read fails still answers success, because the save succeeded, and is reported as error HM7390: the change is in the database and not yet in effect, until a reinitialise, a restart, or another save. The Control Panel reads each item fresh, sets, saves and reads again, so it is not affected. The other collections were never shared this way and behave as before: TCP/IP ports, security ranges, the white list, the greylisting lists, blocked senders, sender list entries, and everything loaded for the COM object itself (domains, accounts, aliases, lists, rules, fetch accounts, app passwords, folder permissions). What 6.3.4 adds to the object model Six new interfaces make 100 coclasses, and the IDL has 1,884 HRESULT declarations against 6.3.3's 1,375. The wiki page lists every member; this is the shape of it. Interface Added in 6.3.4 Application Roles, CurrentRole, CurrentPermissions, RoleAssignments, AssignRole, ResetPassword, UnlockAccount Settings RemoteDomainPolicies; GetChangedFromDefault, GetSettingDefault; IniSettingApplies, IniSettingAppliesAll, PendingIniSettings; the profiles (GetProfiles, ApplyProfile, RevertProfile and the rest) Domain Rules; the quota policy; the domain transforms and disclaimer; SenderList; the DKIM rotation members; SpamTraps Account MoveTo; GetDevices, RevokeDevice; RoleName, RoleDomains, RolePermissions; the nine Directory properties; ExportArchive; Kind (0 a person, 1 a meeting room, 2 a piece of equipment) Utilities among others GetAuditTrail, VerifyAuditTrail, RevertAuditedChange, GetSetupChecklist, MoveMailbox, RunDkimRotation DistributionList Membership, and the list manager's members BackupManager, BackupSettings LoadEncryptedBackup, RestoreMailbox, RestoreMessage; EncryptionPassphrase (write-only), EncryptionPassphraseSet New RemoteDomainPolicies and RemoteDomainPolicy; SenderListEntries and SenderListEntry; GreyListingBypassEntries and GreyListingBypassEntry eServerState gains hStateDraining (5). The rule criteria gain eFTAttachmentName (9), eFTSensitiveContent (10), eFTAttachmentType (11), eFTExternalRecipient (12) and eFTContent (13), and the rule actions eRAAddDisclaimer (11), eRAReject (12), eRARequireTLS (13), eRAQuarantine (14) and eRAWarnSender (15). Roles over COM, and why API keys are not Since 6.3.4, authority is a role: serveradmin, domainadmin, helpdesk, auditor or a custom one, given to an account for named domains. Nothing changes on the day you upgrade: an account with no assignment holds exactly what its AdminLevel has always given it. An account with a role signs in with its own address and password, and COM asks the same question REST asks. Application.CurrentRole and CurrentPermissions say what the session holds. Administrator roles end to end has the permissions, the domains a role reaches and the Control Panel pages each role sees. Giving a role over COM is Application.AssignRole("[email protected]", "helpdesk", "example.test"), with an empty role name to take it away. Account.RoleName, RoleDomains and RolePermissions read it back. Custom roles are made over REST (POST /api/v1/roles), and COM has no way to delete a role at all. A help desk and an auditor over COM. A help desk's script has Application.ResetPassword, UnlockAccount and GlobalObjects.MessageTrace; COM's settings objects answer only the server administrator, so an auditor reads the configuration through the Deck or REST. Refusals that do not give anything away. Application.ResetPassword and UnlockAccount answer No such account. alike for an account that does not exist and for one the role does not reach. Settings.ClearLogonFailureList answers the server administrator alone. The question is asked where the write is made, not where the object was reached. Account.Save, Account.Delete, Account.MoveTo, Application.ResetPassword, the app passwords, and every write to what is in an account (FetchAccount.Save, Rule.Save, IMAPFolder.Save, Message.Save and the rest) each ask that the credential reach the account and take in its authority. An event script's objects carry no credential and are left as they were. API keys are not a COM object. The API key store has never been COM-visible. The key store (/api/v1/apikeys) answers to the administrator password and to nothing else, and a key is given a role with POST /api/v1/apikeys and "role":"helpdesk". The Control Panel's REST API keys page does not go through COM either: it edits hMailServerApiKeys.ini directly. What this server has changed from stock Since 6.3.4, Settings.GetChangedFromDefault answers every setting whose value is not the one this version ships with, with the shipped value beside it: the same document, byte for byte, as GET /api/v1/settings/changed. Only the administrator password may read it; an API key of any scope and an account holding an administrative role are both refused. The settings topic says what each entry carries. Distribution lists and the directory A list that defines itself. Since 6.3.4, DistributionList.Membership is a string property, read and written like the moderator and bounce addresses, holding a membership query whose accounts are added to the list's own recipients. A domain administrator over COM may set domain, a pattern: in a domain it holds, or nothing; the server administrator may set any form, and a query the server cannot answer is refused when it is saved. Aliases, distribution lists and membership queries has the five forms and how a query is answered. The directory. Since 6.3.4 an account has Account.DirectoryTitle, .DirectoryDepartment, .DirectoryPhone, .DirectoryMobile, .DirectoryOffice, .DirectoryOptOut, .DirectoryNote, .DirectoryPhoto (base64) and .DirectoryPhotoType (read-only). The row is read at the first get and written by Account.Save() with the rest. A change of the opt-out through Account.Save() is recorded on the audit trail as directory-opt-out-changed. The Import Tool The Import Tool is a Windows program (Start menu > hMailServer > Import Tool) that works through the COM API: it brings mbox files into an account, handing each message to the server through Utilities.ImportMessageFromFileToIMAPFolder, reads a Maildir with its flags, and creates accounts in bulk from a text file. Bringing mailboxes in covers each of its jobs. The breach check applies to a COM script. It is off by default. Where it has been switched on, it runs whenever a password is set through COM Account.Password, the Import Tool's included, and a bulk operation makes one request per account: run a large import against a mirror, or with the check off. What it does not do The COM API and the Control Panel do not exist on Linux, and there is no Import Tool on Linux. The Import Tool does not read PST files. The file goes into the server's import directory, and REST, hmctl or the Control Deck start the job. COM has no API keys and cannot delete a role. These features have no COM surface at all and are REST only: SCIM provisioning, SAML and OpenID Connect sign-in, passkeys, the S/MIME authority, the send API, migrations, IP warm-up, eDiscovery, mail in to a webhook and mailbox encryption at rest, among others the wiki lists. Where to read more The COM API and Scripting, sections 23.1 to 23.5, and APIs Reference, sections 8 and 9. Roles.md, ChangedFromStock.md, DistributionLists.md and Directory.md. Migration.md for the Import Tool, and Upgrading.md for what an upgrader's scripts now see. The public documentation's COM API chapter and its Import Tool section. On this forum: Upgrading to 6.3.4, the 6.3.4 announcement, event scripts, and the REST API for what COM does not reach.
  • The REST API that RestApiPort turns on — tokens and OAuth2, provisioning scripts, and control panels, billing systems and directory syncs that call it.

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    ProgressiverobotP
    An organisation that keeps its people in an identity provider wants two things of its mail server: mailboxes that follow the directory, and a sign-in that goes through it. Since 6.3.4 hMailServer has both. SCIM 2.0 at /scim/v2 lets Microsoft Entra ID or Okta make, rename, suspend and remove accounts, with their aliases and distribution lists. Single sign-on, by OpenID Connect or SAML 2.0, opens the webmail at /portal and the Control Deck at /. The one thing to know first: they answer different questions and take different credentials. SCIM answers to an API key whose role holds provision and to nothing else. Single sign-on opens the two pages only: IMAP, POP3 and SMTP still take the account's password and its application passwords. Passkeys and account recovery are covered in the topic on signing in. How the pieces fit Piece Direction What it does LDAP directory authentication This server asks the directory Checks a password when somebody signs in SCIM provisioning The identity provider calls this server Says what changed, as it changes Single sign-on The browser goes to the identity provider and back Signs a person in to the webmail or the Control Deck oidc_auto_provision, saml_auto_provision In passing, at sign-in Makes a mailbox for whoever arrives with a verified address, and never touches it again SCIM is the deliberate version of auto-provisioning. The two work together: SCIM keeps the mailboxes, and single sign-on is how the people it made sign in to them. Where the settings are. The single sign-on settings are the REST API's and the Control Deck's. There is no COM property and no Control Panel page for them, on Windows or on Linux. SCIM: the key and the permission A SCIM request is a request of the REST listener. RestApiPort has to be on and the listener reachable from the identity provider's service over TLS, with a certificate it trusts (RestApiCertificateFile, or the ACME certificate). A body is at most 64 KB, and the key's requests count against the listener's budget of 200 in ten seconds per credential, beyond which the answer is 429 with Retry-After. The key's role must hold provision. The built-in serveradmin role holds it, so every key issued with "scope":"full" provisions; no other built-in role does, so a read-only key is answered 403. The way to issue a key that provisions and does nothing else is a custom role: curl -u Administrator:your-admin-password -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"entra-provisioning","description":"Microsoft Entra ID","permissions":"provision"}' \ https://mail.example.com:8443/api/v1/roles curl -u Administrator:your-admin-password -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"label":"Entra provisioning","role":"entra-provisioning"}' \ https://mail.example.com:8443/api/v1/apikeys The second request, POST /api/v1/apikeys, answers the hmapi_... token once, and that token is the identity provider's secret. provision is needed for SCIM's reads as well as its writes. Both requests present the administrator password, which works while no second factor is enrolled on it. With one enrolled, sign in once at POST /api/v1/session with the code in X-hMailServer-OTP, and send both requests with the hmailsession cookie and X-Requested-With: hMailServer: since 6.3.4 a one-time code is taken once, so a second request carrying the same code within the same half minute is refused with 401. Every other credential is refused. The administrator password, an account's password and a browser session are answered 401 on /scim/, in SCIM's shape, with WWW-Authenticate: Bearer. A key confined to named domains ("domains":"example.com") provisions those domains and learns nothing about the rest: listings are filtered, an account elsewhere is the same 404 as one that is not there, and an address elsewhere is refused 400 invalidValue. A key may not change or remove an account whose authority it does not take in, and is answered 403. A key whose role holds provision alone takes in no administrator at all: not a domain administrator, not a help desk, not an auditor. A full key confined to named domains takes in an administrator of those domains and nobody else. A full key issued for every domain takes in every account. SCIM: the routes and the mapping Route What it does GET /scim/v2/ServiceProviderConfig What this server supports: patch, filter (200 at most), changePassword and etag; not bulk and not sort GET /scim/v2/Schemas, GET /scim/v2/ResourceTypes The User and Group schemas, listing only what this server keeps; the two resource types GET, POST /scim/v2/Users The accounts: listed and filtered, or one made GET, PUT, PATCH, DELETE /scim/v2/Users/{id} One account: read, replaced, changed, removed GET, POST /scim/v2/Groups The distribution lists: listed and filtered, or one made GET, PUT, PATCH, DELETE /scim/v2/Groups/{id} One list: read, replaced, changed, removed Every answer under /scim/ is application/scim+json, the refusals included. A User is an account. SCIM This server id, userName The account's address. The id is the address, so a rename changes the id. name.givenName, name.familyName The first and last names, sixty characters each displayName The two names composed. Written alone to an account that already has a name, it is accepted and not kept. active The account's switch. false suspends it and deletes nothing. emails The address, type work and primary, and every alias whose value is the address, type other password Write-only. Judged by the password policy, the reuse history and, when it is on, the breach check. externalId The identity provider's own id for the person, at most 255 characters (schema 6096) meta.created and meta.lastModified are not answered, because the tables keep no such times. A Group is a distribution list: id and displayName are the list's address, and members are its members. The sharing groups at /api/v1/groups are folder-permission principals and are not SCIM groups. Attributes the schemas have and this server does not keep, such as title, phoneNumbers and the enterprise extension's department and manager, are accepted and not kept. A misspelt attribute or path is refused by name. SCIM: what each operation does Making a user. POST /scim/v2/Users needs a userName at a domain this server hosts and the key reaches. A body with no password, which is what Entra sends, makes the account with thirty-two random bytes for one, which nobody is ever told. An address something already has is 409 uniqueness. Filters. These and no others: userName eq, userName co, userName sw, externalId eq, emails.value eq and active eq. Any other filter is 400 invalidFilter. count is at most 200, and sortBy and sortOrder are ignored. Groups filter on displayName eq only. Changing. PUT takes the body a POST takes, and an attribute it leaves out is left as it is. PATCH takes a PatchOp, with op in any case, as Entra capitalises it. If-Match is honoured on PUT, PATCH and DELETE; a version other than the current one is 412. A change is judged whole before anything is written. Suspending. active false refuses every sign-in from the next attempt, refuses mail to the account, ends its browser sessions and drops its live IMAP, POP3 and SMTP connections. The mailbox, the aliases and the lists are untouched. Renaming. A new userName renames the account through the mailbox move. It is refused 409 while the mailbox is in use. The id changes, the old id is 404 from then on, and the old address is kept as an alias until a later request that sends emails leaves it out. Every alias of the account is part of emails, including one an administrator made. An identity provider that replaces emails removes the aliases it does not list. Where aliases are managed on this server and not in the directory, do not map emails beyond the work address. Removing. DELETE /scim/v2/Users/{id} removes the account and its mailbox, every alias emails answered for it, and its row in every distribution list. It answers 204. Nothing of it can be put back but from a backup. Entra sends active false straight away and the DELETE thirty days after a user is soft-deleted, so the suspension is the safe first step. Five diagnostics in the error log, HM7220 to HM7224, name what a SCIM write left behind when it failed part way. Every SCIM write is on the audit trail, each row naming key:<id>. Setting up Microsoft Entra ID for SCIM Issue the key as above and note the token. In the Entra admin centre, Enterprise applications > New application > Create your own application > Integrate any other application you don't find in the gallery (Non-gallery). Provisioning > Automatic. Tenant URL: https://<host>:<port>/scim/v2, where the port is RestApiPort. Secret token: the hmapi_... token. Test connection asks for a user that does not exist and expects an empty list, which is what this server answers. Mappings > Provision Microsoft Entra ID Users: map userName from userPrincipalName where that is the mailbox address, or from mail where it is not. emails[type eq "work"].value must be the same address as userName. Keep active, name.givenName, name.familyName, displayName and externalId, and delete the mappings this server does not keep. Mappings > Provision Microsoft Entra ID Groups, for mail-enabled groups that should be distribution lists: map displayName from mail, keep members, and delete the mapping of externalId. Assign the users and groups, and switch Provisioning Status on. Setting up Okta for SCIM Issue the key as above. Applications > Create App Integration > SAML 2.0 or SWA, then on General enable SCIM provisioning. Provisioning > Integration: SCIM connector base URL https://<host>:<port>/scim/v2; Unique identifier field for users userName; Supported provisioning actions: Import New Users and Profile Updates, Push New Users, Push Profile Updates, Push Groups; Authentication Mode HTTP Header, and the token in Authorization. Provisioning > To App: enable Create Users, Update User Attributes and Deactivate Users. Push Groups sends a group under its Okta name as displayName, and here that is the list's address, so a push of Engineering is 400 invalidValue. Name each pushed group with the list's address, or leave Push Groups off. Okta sends emails with the primary address alone, so an alias made on this server is removed by Okta's next update. Scim.md gives no steps for Google Workspace: at the time it was written, a custom application there could not be pointed at a SCIM endpoint. Single sign-on with OpenID Connect Register this server at the issuer as an authorization-code client with PKCE, with the redirect URI <oidc_redirect_base_url>/portal/oidc/callback. Setting What it is oidc_issuer For example https://login.example.com. The discovery document is read from <issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration and cached for an hour. Empty offers no single sign-on at all. oidc_client_id The client id this server is registered under oidc_client_secret Its secret, stored protected and never emitted. Empty for a public client. oidc_scopes openid email by default oidc_redirect_base_url The address the webmail is reached at from outside. Empty falls back to import_oauth_redirect_base_url. oidc_auto_provision Whether a verified address with no mailbox here gets one. Off. oidc_administrators The addresses that open the Control Deck as the administrator. Empty means single sign-on reaches the webmail only. The flow is GET /portal/oidc/start[?deck=1] to the issuer and GET /portal/oidc/callback back. The callback verifies the id_token: its signature against the issuer's published keys (RS256 and ES256 only), iss, aud, exp, iat and nbf with a minute of skew, and the nonce. It then takes email, and only when email_verified says the issuer verified it. With oidc_issuer set, both sign-in pages draw a Sign in with button naming the issuer's host. What they draw is decided by GET /api/v1/signin-methods, which needs no credential and says nothing about who exists here. With SAML set up it answers saml: true and saml_label, and both pages draw a second button. The callback does not make the session. It mints a one-use ticket, good for two minutes, and the page hands it to POST /api/v1/session, which is where every browser session is made. The ticket is bound to the browser by an hmsso cookie, and POST /api/v1/session refuses a ticket that arrives without it. Mapping. The verified address is looked up as a mailbox. With auto-provisioning off, the default, a sign-in with no mailbox is refused. With it on, a mailbox is made, but only at a domain this server already has, and with a random password nobody is told. For the Control Deck, the address must be in oidc_administrators. An issuer that says somebody is an administrator is not obeyed. Single sign-on with SAML 2.0 For identity providers that speak only SAML 2.0: ADFS above all, and an Entra ID or Okta application set up the SAML way. It ends in the same ticket, the same POST /api/v1/session and the same mapping rules. Setting What it is saml_idp_entity_id The identity provider's entity ID. Empty, the default, offers no SAML sign-in at all. saml_idp_sso_url Its sign-in URL for the HTTP-Redirect binding saml_idp_certificate Its signing certificate in PEM, or two while it rolls its key over. Write-only. saml_sp_entity_id This server's entity ID. Empty means <base URL>/saml. saml_email_attribute The attribute the address is read from when the NameID is not an email address saml_require_signed_assertion Whether the Assertion must carry its own signature. On by default. saml_auto_provision, saml_administrators As the OpenID Connect settings of the same names saml_button_label The words on the button: Sign in with SAML by default The base URL is OpenID Connect's: oidc_redirect_base_url, falling back to import_oauth_redirect_base_url. From it follow the entity ID <base URL>/saml, the ACS URL <base URL>/portal/saml/acs and the metadata at <base URL>/saml/metadata. Identity provider What to enter there What to copy back Microsoft Entra ID Identifier (Entity ID) <base URL>/saml; Reply URL <base URL>/portal/saml/acs; token encryption off Login URL to saml_idp_sso_url; Microsoft Entra Identifier to saml_idp_entity_id; Certificate (Base64) to saml_idp_certificate Okta Single sign-on URL <base URL>/portal/saml/acs; Audience URI (SP Entity ID) <base URL>/saml; Name ID format EmailAddress; Assertion Encryption Unencrypted Identity Provider Single Sign-On URL to saml_idp_sso_url; Identity Provider Issuer to saml_idp_entity_id; X.509 Certificate to saml_idp_certificate ADFS A claims-aware relying party trust, imported from <base URL>/saml/metadata or entered by hand; E-Mail-Addresses sent as E-Mail Address https://<adfs host>/adfs/ls/ as saml_idp_sso_url; the Federation Service Identifier as saml_idp_entity_id; the Token-signing certificate as saml_idp_certificate The flow. GET /portal/saml/start[?deck=1] to the identity provider, with an AuthnRequest, and the hmsaml cookie POST /portal/saml/acs back from it, with the Response GET /portal/saml/finish on from the ACS, where the cookie is asked for GET /saml/metadata this service provider, for the identity provider The ACS takes a form of at most 256 KB; a larger body is answered 413. The signature is verified against the certificates an administrator stored and never a key the message carries. The signature method must be rsa-sha256 or ecdsa-sha256, and SHA-1 is refused. A Response is taken only when it answers a request this server issued, not yet answered, with the same RelayState. The checks refuse signature wrapping, a replayed Response or assertion, a Response nobody asked for and an encrypted assertion; comment injection in the NameID gains nothing, because the address read is the whole of what was signed. A saml_idp_certificate that cannot be read stops every SAML sign-in. The settings refuse one, so it comes only from a database edited by hand; HM7320 in the error log then names the setting to paste again. A SAML identity provider says nothing like email_verified. The attribute the address is read from must be one the directory controls, such as mail or the user principal name, and never one a person can set themselves. This server cannot check that. What it does not do SCIM: no bulk, no sorting and no POST .search (/Bulk, /Me and POST .search answer 501); no enterprise user extension; no groups but distribution lists; not a SCIM client. externalId is shown by nothing but SCIM and COM's Account.ExternalId, which is Windows-only. Single sign-on, both kinds: no logout in either direction, so an account disabled at the identity provider keeps a session it already started until that session's own ceiling ends it. One OpenID Connect issuer and one SAML identity provider. Nothing is enforced at IMAP, POP3 and SMTP. OpenID Connect: no claims mapping. The email claim and nothing else. SAML: no encrypted assertions, no signed requests, no metadata fetch, no artifact binding and no sign-in started by the identity provider. Where to read more The operator documents: Scim.md, PasskeysAndSingleSignOn.md and Roles.md. The wiki: The REST API and APIs Reference. The public documentation: chapter 24, The REST API and chapter 36, The Control Deck and the webmail portal. On this forum: passkeys, recovery and the rest of sign-in are in Signing in: passwords, second factor, passkeys, single sign-on; LDAP sign-in and directory synchronisation are in Active Directory and LDAP sign-in; The Control Deck; the 6.3.4 announcement; and the REST API guide.
  • Sieve (RFC 5228) and ManageSieve, the classic rules engine, global rules, SMTP routes, aliases and distribution lists — sorting and steering mail without code.

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    ProgressiverobotP
    Written for 6.3.4. hMailServer 6.3.7 (17 October 2026) regroups the Control Panel's sidebar: the Journaling and dual delivery page is Journaling & dual delivery, in the new Compliance group rather than under Monitoring & troubleshooting as the table below has it, and Ctrl+K takes the old title to it. See the 6.3.7 announcement. A journal rule sends a copy of a domain's mail, or of one account's, to an address. Exchange calls it journaling and sends an envelope report with the message attached; Google calls it dual delivery and sends the message itself. In hMailServer they are one mechanism with two shapes of copy, new in 6.3.4 (27 September 2026, schema 6104; the rules themselves arrived with schema 6075). This topic covers what a rule says, the two shapes, when a rule is evaluated, how it avoids looping, where it is edited, and what it deliberately does not do. The one thing to know first: a journal rule covers mail that comes in through the SMTP session, a fetch account or the send API, and nothing this server queues itself. A compliance archive built on a journal rule therefore has known gaps, and they are listed exactly below. Nothing is journalled until a rule exists. With an empty table the whole of this costs one comparison per accepted message. What a rule says Field Meaning scope domain or account: whose mail the rule is about target The domain name, or the account address. It must be a domain this server hosts, or an account in one direction inbound (a message with a local recipient the rule covers), outbound (a message from an authenticated sender it covers), or both journal_address Where the copy goes. One address, local or anywhere else, checked as an address before the row is written. It may be a mailbox in the very domain the rule journals; it may not be the account an account rule names mode report or copy enabled A rule that is off copies nothing and keeps everything it said note Why the rule exists. At most 255 characters The rules are stored in hm_journalrules. The row holds the domain id and, for an account rule, the account id, so nothing breaks when a domain or an account is renamed under it. A domain's rules go with the domain when it is deleted, and a rule naming an account goes with the account. A rule has no conditions. It covers all of a domain's or an account's mail in the direction it names. There is no "only messages over 10 MB" and no "only from these senders"; a mail flow rule is the place for that. The two shapes report is the Exchange journal shape: a multipart/mixed message whose first part is the envelope report and whose second part is the original message attached as message/rfc822, written through byte for byte. The report is four fixed fields, one per line, in one order: Sender: [email protected] Subject: Quarterly figures Message-Id: <[email protected]> Recipient: [email protected] Recipient: [email protected] The envelope is the point. A message's To and Cc headers are what the sender typed; the Recipient: lines are where the message actually went, blind copies and expanded lists included. A message with no envelope sender - a bounce - writes Sender: <>. copy is the message itself, as it was accepted, with one header line (X-hMailServer-Journal) in front of it and nothing else changed: not the body, not its transfer encoding, not its signature. The file is written byte for byte rather than through the MIME writer. What a migration or a second mail system wants is the mail, not a report about it; that is what copy is for. Both shapes are queued through the ordinary delivery queue, so a journal address somewhere else is delivered, retried and bounced as any other mail is, and a local one lands in a mailbox. The envelope sender of a journal message is the journalled domain's postmaster, not the person who wrote the message. A journal address that stops answering is the administrator's problem, and bouncing it to the sender would tell somebody outside this server that their mail is being copied. When a rule is evaluated Once per accepted message, in the SMTP session, after the row is saved and the message file is settled - the same place, and the same recipient list, the on-disk archive decision is made from. Not at delivery: the deliverer runs again for every retry and for every route a message splits into, and a compliance archive that gained a second copy because a remote host was busy would be worse than useless. One report or copy per matching rule per message, not per recipient. A domain rule that matches a message addressed to three accounts of the domain sends one report, with all three on it. There are three points of entry where rules are evaluated: The SMTP session. The outbound half judges an authenticated sender; this is what a desktop or phone client uses. A fetch account. Mail a mailbox collects from another provider by POP3 or IMAP is journalled once per message, at the same point in that path. A download has no authenticated sender, so it is the inbound half of a rule that speaks for it, and it has no SMTP session, so its lines go to the application log. The send API, POST /api/v1/send, which is new in 6.3.4 and is journalled in it (CHANGELOG lists the fix in its 6.3.4 section). The key's sender counts as the sender an outbound rule judges when that sender is an account here. What a journal rule does not see A message the server queues itself is queued past all three points and is not journalled in either direction, even when it is addressed to a mailbox a rule covers: Not journalled Note A message the webmail queues directly POST /api/v1/me/messages A send-later draft A message written by an event script A mail flow rule's forward, copy or reply An automatic reply A Sieve redirect An account's forwarding A delivery report Two consequences follow, and both matter to anyone relying on this for compliance: The outbound half covers SMTP submission and the send API, and not the browser. Mail a person sends from the webmail is not journalled by an outbound rule. The inbound half covers mail from outside this server, and not what the server sends on to a mailbox of its own. Two further limits of the same kind: A message that was refused is not journalled. A message rejected at RCPT TO or by a rule never existed as far as this is concerned. A message held for review is journalled, because it was accepted. Not looping There is one guard, and it takes nobody's word for anything. Every journal message this server writes carries X-hMailServer-Journal, and its value is the rule's id, a full stop, and a mark: 128 random bits the server process chose when it first needed one. The evaluation reads that header before it does anything else and stops only when the mark is this process's own. A journal message that comes back into this server - relayed by the far end, forwarded by the journal mailbox's owner - is never journalled again, and the guard stops the copy, not the delivery: the mailbox still gets its mail. A message carrying the header with any other value is journalled exactly as it would have been without it, and the attempt is noted in the log. The header's name is in the published document, so a guard that honoured the header as written would let anybody under an outbound compliance rule keep a message out of the archive by typing one line into their mail client. An archive that the people it is about can opt out of is not an archive. Three properties of the mark to understand: It is per process, and nothing is stored for it. A restart forgets the marks it wrote, so one of this server's own reports that returns after a restart is journalled once more, and the report that makes carries a mark the running process does know, so it stops there. A loop cannot run away; the price of keeping no secret on disk is one duplicate. It is not a signature over the message. It travels in the messages it marks, so whoever can read this server's journal mail - the journal address itself, and anything relaying to it - could quote a mark back in a message of their own and keep that one message out of the archive. If that relay is a worry, journal to a local mailbox, or over an authenticated route. There is no second guard, and no rule is skipped for where its journal address points. Journalling a domain into a mailbox of that domain works. example.com to [email protected] sends one report per message into that mailbox and nothing cascades, because a journal message is written straight into the delivery queue and never passes an evaluation point. It used to be refused at run time, silently: the rule matched, the copy was dropped with a line in the log, and every surface went on showing the rule as enabled. That guard went. The one arrangement refused is an account journalled into itself, and it is refused when the rule is written rather than found out later: it would put every message in the mailbox twice and archive nothing anywhere. Where it is edited Journal rules are the server administrator's. A rule says that somebody's mail is copied to an address outside their sight, so a credential confined to named domains is refused even though a rule names one. Surface How Platform REST GET/POST /api/v1/journal-rules, PUT/DELETE /api/v1/journal-rules/{id} Windows and Linux The Control Deck The Journaling view: every rule, a switch on each row, and a form to add one Windows and Linux The Control Panel The Journaling and dual delivery page, under Monitoring & troubleshooting (since 6.3.7 Journaling & dual delivery, in the Compliance group; Ctrl+K takes the old title to it), over three Utilities methods (GetJournalRules, SaveJournalRule, DeleteJournalRule) Windows only hmctl hmctl journalrule list\|create\|update\|delete A client over the REST API PowerShell module Get-HmJournalRule, New-HmJournalRule, Set-HmJournalRule, Remove-HmJournalRule Over the REST API Over REST, reading needs view_configuration and writing needs manage_server, so the auditor role reads the rules and writes none. Every surface goes through one function on the server, Journaling::SaveRule, so the three small vocabularies (domain/account, inbound/outbound/both, report/copy) mean the same thing whichever you use, and a refusal reads the same sentence. Writing, changing or removing a rule is on the audit trail. Setting up a compliance copy for one domain: Decide the journal address. A mailbox in the same domain, such as [email protected], is allowed; an address elsewhere is delivered through the ordinary queue. Create one rule with scope domain, target the domain name, direction both, mode report and the journal_address. Over SMTP - from a mail client signed in to an account, or from outside, and not from the webmail - send one message to two recipients of the domain, one of them as a blind copy, and open what arrives at the journal address: one report for the message, with a Recipient: line for each envelope recipient. Then send one message from the webmail and confirm that it is not journalled, so that whoever owns the archive knows the gap is there. A rule is refused before it is written for an unhosted target, a word outside the three vocabularies, no journal address, one that is not an address, one carrying a line break, and an account journalled into itself. Journaling beside three other features Sealed mail. The journal keeps the bytes verbatim, so a message that was encrypted end to end still decrypts from the copy - but nobody reviewing the journal can read its content. Restricted delivery. A journal rule's copy of a restricted account's mail goes where the rule says, because the copy is the administrator's and not the account's forward. Rules and Sieve. A rule's forward, copy or reply and a Sieve redirect are among the messages the server queues itself, so they are not journalled. What it does not do It is not the archive. ArchiveDir and ArchiveDomains keep files on this server; a journal rule sends mail elsewhere. Neither replaces the other, and turning one on does not turn the other off. It is not eDiscovery. A case searches the mailboxes, their deleted items and the archive on this server, and a journal copy has left it. A journal address that is a mailbox here is searched like any other custodian. It is not an account's forwarding. A forward is the account holder's, and can deliver instead of the mailbox. A journal copy is the administrator's, and never changes what the mailbox gets. It is not a mail flow rule's forward or copy action. Those have conditions, run per delivery attempt, and can be edited by the account. It is not retention. Once a journal message leaves the queue it belongs to whatever receives it. This server keeps no second copy, expires nothing and withdraws nothing; deleting a rule stops the next copy and does not reach the ones already sent. It is not encryption or redaction. A journal address outside your control sees everything the recipient sees. Where to read more The document at the 6.3.4 tag: Journaling.md, with Discovery.md, SendApi.md, SealedMail.md and RestrictedDelivery.md Wiki: Routes and Relays (section 14.2d) and Compliance and eDiscovery On this forum: the 6.3.4 release announcement; Rules and Sieve for the forwards and redirects a journal rule does not see; restricted delivery; the send API; compliance, eDiscovery and legal holds; and the archive
  • Prometheus and OTLP, /livez and /readyz, JSON logs into Elasticsearch, Loki or Splunk, and reading hMailServer's own logs when you are chasing a delivery.

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    ProgressiverobotP
    Written for 6.3.4. hMailServer 6.3.7 (17 October 2026) moves the Control Panel's Audit trail page, with journaling and eDiscovery, into a new Compliance group, and the alerts' settings, the outbound webhooks and the SNMP agent onto its Monitoring & alerts page (API & monitoring until 6.3.6; 6.3.5 and 6.3.6 had them on Logging); Ctrl+K takes an old title or route to its page. It also fixes the SMTP log, whose lines the syslog sink copies, which wrote some credentials in the clear with SMTP logging on, in every version from 6.0.0 to 6.3.6 (work item #95). See the 6.3.7 announcement. This topic covers four things 6.3.4 adds for being told what the server is doing and who changed it: the alerts, the audit trail, the syslog sink (or the systemd journal on Linux) and the per-domain reports, with a paragraph on following one connection live. The one thing to know first: after the upgrade to 6.3.4 the audit trail and the alerts are on, with seven of the eleven conditions enabled, but nothing is mailed until AlertRecipient and AlertSenderAddress are set. What 6.3.4 switches on without a switch From the CHANGELOG's list of what changes on upgrade: the audit trail is on (schema 6043), and keeps every row until a retention is set. Compromised-account detection starts in watch mode (schema 6071): it raises account.compromised but holds nothing until compromise_detection_mode is set to enforce. The reputation watch, which raises reputation.listed, is on in a new installation and off after an upgrade. Alerts A condition is a row in hm_alertrules (on or off, threshold, mail or webhook or both, cool-down, at once or in the digest); an event is a row in hm_alertevents. Delivery is AlertTask, once a minute, and nothing else sends, so an alert about the delivery queue is never itself submitted into the stuck queue. Condition On as shipped Raised by Threshold backup.failed yes A backup that failed, and a scheduled backup that could not run. Sent at once — certificate.expiring yes The notAfter of every configured certificate, read once a minute 7 days disk.low no The free-space warning band, and again below the floor; cleared on recovery — queue.stalled no A work queue whose every thread has been in the same task past AsyncQueueStallThreshold — autoban.storm no Auto-bans in the last hour 25 minidump.written no A crash dump newer than the last one recorded, in the log directory — complaints.rate.high yes A hosted domain's complaint rate over the feedback loops' seven-day window; inert while complaint processing is off, and a domain that sent fewer than 100 messages is not judged 1,000 per million dkim.rotation.stalled yes A rotation whose next key's record has not been seen for the threshold, or a running rotation whose last move failed 7 days account.compromised yes Compromised-account detection at submission, one event per account per hour; in watch mode the detail says what enforcing would have done — account.password-reset yes A password reset completed through an account's confirmed recovery address; no cool-down and no digest — reputation.listed yes The reputation watch's stored rows; sent at once, and a check that was refused or timed out does not clear it — The four that are off are noisy on a healthy server. The settings. All nine are rows of hm_settings, none an hMailServer.ini key. They are in the server group of GET/PUT /api/v1/settings, on the Deck's Settings page, and on Windows over COM through Settings. The CHANGELOG and AlertsAndAuditTrail.md spell some in their hm_settings form (AlertRecipient, AlertSenderAddress and so on); the REST keys are these. REST key Default Meaning alerts_enabled on The master switch alert_recipient empty Where alerts and the digest go; a rule can name an address of its own instead alert_sender_address empty What they are sent from; a rule with no sender sends nothing alert_digest_enabled on Whether rules marked for the digest wait for it alert_digest_hour 7 The hour, UTC, the digest goes out; a digest with nothing in it is not sent alert_max_per_hour 20 Past this many single alerts in an hour, everything goes into the digest alert_webhook_max_attempts 5 Webhook attempts before an event is dead-lettered (1 to 20) audit_trail_enabled on Whether administrative changes are recorded audit_retention_days 0 Days of trail to keep; 0 keeps everything Nothing may flap. A state condition already raised is not raised again; an occurrence inside the rule's cool-down is recorded but held for the digest; and the digest is one message listing what fired. Webhooks. A rule whose actions is 2 (webhook) or 3 (mail and webhook) POSTs one JSON object per event (condition, state, severity, time, time_utc, summary, detail, server) with three headers: X-hMailServer-Timestamp, X-hMailServer-Signature: sha256=<hex> and X-hMailServer-Event. It is signed under the rule's shared secret, as every webhook the server sends is; the topic on integrating applications shows how to verify it. A rule that calls a webhook is refused without an address and without a secret; webhook_secret is write-only and the listing says only webhook_secret_set. Only https, or plain http to a loopback address, is used. An attempt that does not get a 2xx is retried on the next pass, then after 1, 5 and 15 minutes, which is the default five attempts, and 60 minutes apart after that if the maximum is raised. After the last attempt the event is dead-lettered: kept, no longer retried, and reported once in the error log as HM6543. Route Does Permission GET /api/v1/alerts/rules Every condition and its rule view_configuration PUT /api/v1/alerts/rules/{condition} Change one, or create one for a condition nothing ships; a field left out keeps its value manage_settings GET /api/v1/alerts/events What has fired, newest first, with the webhook's state view_configuration POST /api/v1/alerts/test Raise a condition through the path a real one takes: {"condition":"disk.low","summary":"...","occurrence":false} manage_settings POST /api/v1/alerts/run Run one pass now manage_server All five are refused to every API key. The administrator password reaches them, and so does an account whose role holds the permission and reaches every domain. Neither the Control Panel nor the Deck has a page for the rules, and hmctl and the PowerShell module have no alerts or audit verbs; hmctl api reaches the routes. The audit trail One row per administrative change made over COM, REST or the Deck, in hm_audit: when (audittime, UTC); who (auditactor: Administrator over COM, administrator or key:<id> over REST, and an account signed in with its own password is its address over COM and account:<address> over REST and the Deck); the interface and, except over COM, the peer address; the object's type and name; the action (created, updated or deleted, also unlocked, cleared, moved and move failed, the last for a mailbox move that failed and could not be put back); the detail (the columns the change carried, or for a setting Name: old -> new, ending [role: <name>] under a role); and the two hashes of the chain. Both kinds of setting are recorded: the hm_settings values and the [Settings] keys (in hm_inisettings since schema 6042), with the value they had. A key set for the first time reads SmtpTarpitCount: (default) -> 5; returned to its default it reads SmtpTarpitCount: 5 -> (default), with the action deleted. A write of the value a setting already has records nothing. What is never recorded as a value. A password, key, token, secret, hash, salt or passphrase is recorded as (changed), decided by the name of the column or setting, matched as a substring, so MetricsServerAuthToken and PasswordPepper are among them. Fifteen keys whose names only look like secrets, the seven PasswordPolicy* keys among them, are recorded with their values. The server's own writes (delivery, retention, greylisting, the index) are never recorded. Verifying the chain. Each row carries the SHA-256 of the row before it and of itself. GET /api/v1/audit/verify answers {"intact","rows_checked","first_broken_id","reason"}, and the reason tells a row that was edited from one that was removed. This makes tampering detectable, not impossible: whoever can write the table can recompute the whole chain. Rows hashed the older way, which only a build from before the 6.3.4 release can have written, did not cover a character above U+00FF; they still verify, with that weakness. Reading it. GET /api/v1/audit?actor=&object_type=&action=&since=&until=&limit=&offset= answers newest first; actor is a substring, so key: finds every change made with an API key, and limit is 1 to 1,000, default 100. It needs the administrator password, or an account whose role holds view_audit (the auditor role) and is not confined to named domains. Every API key is refused, with 401 rather than 403, so that it learns nothing from asking. Putting a change back. POST /api/v1/audit/{id}/revert writes a setting's old value back through the same setter, so the put-back is itself a row in the trail. It needs manage_settings and is refused with 409 for a row that is not a setting's change, a secret's row, a value the trail cut at 120 characters, and a setting this version no longer has. Where to see it. The Deck's Audit trail view has the filters, paging, Verify the chain and Put back. On Windows the Control Panel has the same page, over COM, at Monitoring & troubleshooting → Audit trail (Compliance → Audit trail since 6.3.7; Ctrl+K takes the old route to it). Switching recording off is itself recorded. The trail, the rules and the events are not in the built-in backup. What it holds for compliance. A download of a discovery export is recorded on the trail alone, so with the trail off it is recorded nowhere. An erasure is recorded with the address it erased wherever it deletes from recorded tables (aliases, distribution-list recipients and, with the archive included, the archive index), and audit_retention_days is how those rows age out. The compliance topic covers eDiscovery and the erasure. What it does not record. Reads; what a restore replaces (the request is one row, restore started); creating or revoking a REST API key; releasing or deleting a quarantined message; creating, renaming or deleting a public folder; the [Security], [Directories] and [Database] sections of hMailServer.ini; and a change nobody made through an interface. A change to the twelve syslog settings over COM, from the Control Panel's Logging page for one, is recorded in 6.3.4: the settings property setters carry an audit scope of their own. The wiki's syslog section, 16.2a, still describes the earlier state. Syslog and the journal (since 6.3.4) Every entry the server logs can also be sent as RFC 5424 to a syslog collector over UDP, TCP or TLS. It is a copy: the files under LogFolder are written as before. On Windows the settings are the syslog (RFC 5424) card on the Control Panel's Logging page; on Linux they are keys of PUT /api/v1/settings/logging and the Control Deck, and hmctl settings get logging prints them. They take effect when the sink starts, at the next service start or Reinitialize, not when they are saved. hm_settings name REST key Default Meaning SyslogEnabled syslog_enabled off The whole feature SyslogHost syslog_host empty Empty is not "off": on Linux under systemd it selects the journal; on Windows nothing is sent, which the server says once in the application log SyslogPort syslog_port 514 514 for UDP and plain TCP; 6514 is the registered port for TLS SyslogTransport syslog_transport 0 (UDP) 0 UDP, 1 TCP, 2 TCP over TLS; the REST key takes udp, tcp or tls SyslogFacility syslog_facility 2 (mail) 0 to 23; 16 to 23 are local0 to local7 SyslogMinimumSeverity syslog_minimum_severity 6 (informational) Entries less severe than this are not sent SyslogLogTypes syslog_log_smtp, syslog_log_pop3, syslog_log_imap, syslog_log_application, syslog_log_tcpip, syslog_log_debug 86 One bit mask: SMTP, POP3, application and IMAP on; TCP/IP and debug off Errors are sent whatever the mask says. A message looks like this: <22>1 2026-09-15T14:21:09.284+01:00 mail.example.com hMailServer 4812 SMTPD [hmailserver@32473 thread="7412" session="41" client="203.0.113.9"] <BOM>RECEIVED: MAIL FROM:<[email protected]> The message id is the log category (SMTPD and so on) or, on an error line carrying an hMailServer error number, that number, so msgid == HM5165 is a usable filter at the collector. The structured data under hmailserver@32473 carries thread, and session and client on a conversation line. UDP truncates each message to 1024 bytes, cutting the text and never the header; TCP and TLS frame each message with its length and truncate nothing below 65000 bytes. TLS verifies the collector's certificate against the machine's trust store and the configured host name, so set the host to the name in the certificate, not an IP address; no client certificate is offered. A collector that is down costs log lines, not mail. Entries go to a background thread over a queue of 4096 that drops the oldest when full; a stream that cannot connect backs off from one second to a minute; and the application log gets one line when an outage starts and one when it ends, with the number dropped. Nothing is retried from disk. Each step of a stream transport (the connection, the TLS handshake, one entry written) is given ten seconds, so a collector that accepts the connection and then goes quiet is a failure like a refused one, and a reinitialise or a service stop waits for that step at most. For rsyslog, in /etc/rsyslog.d/30-hmailserver.conf (UDP for the default transport, TCP for SyslogTransport = 1; the stop keeps the lines out of /var/log/mail.log too, so drop it if you want both): module(load="imudp") input(type="imudp" port="514") module(load="imtcp") input(type="imtcp" port="514") if ($app-name == "hMailServer") then { action(type="omfile" file="/var/log/hmailserver.log" template="RSYSLOG_SyslogProtocol23Format") stop } Without RSYSLOG_SyslogProtocol23Format rsyslog reformats to the older RFC 3164 shape and the structured data is lost. For TLS (SyslogTransport = 2 module(load="imtcp" StreamDriver.Name="gtls" StreamDriver.Mode="1" StreamDriver.AuthMode="anon") input(type="imtcp" port="6514") global(DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile="/etc/ssl/certs/ca.pem" DefaultNetstreamDriverCertFile="/etc/rsyslog.d/collector-cert.pem" DefaultNetstreamDriverKeyFile="/etc/rsyslog.d/collector-key.pem") A self-signed collector certificate has to be installed as trusted on the hMailServer machine, or the handshake is refused and nothing is sent. The journal, on Linux only, needs no collector. Where the server runs as the packaged hmailserver.service, switch the sink on and leave the collector host empty: $ hmctl settings set logging --set syslog_enabled=true $ sudo systemctl restart hmailserver $ journalctl -u hmailserver -f Beside the standard fields the journal gets HMAILSERVER_CATEGORY, HMAILSERVER_MSGID, HMAILSERVER_THREAD, HMAILSERVER_SESSION and HMAILSERVER_CLIENT: $ journalctl -u hmailserver HMAILSERVER_SESSION=41 $ journalctl -u hmailserver HMAILSERVER_MSGID=HM5165 If a collector host is configured the journal is not used. The start of the sink is itself logged, as Syslog: sending RFC 5424 log entries to <host>:<port> over UDP, facility 2. or Syslog: writing log entries to the systemd journal.; a server that logs neither has the feature off. Not sent: the AWStats log, the backup log and the event-script log. Per-domain reports (since 6.3.4) GET /api/v1/reports is an index of the sections, the state of their three sources and what this server cannot answer. A report drawn while its source was off is empty, which is not the same statement as "nothing happened"; each section's note says which it is. GET /api/v1/reports/{section} answers one section, the Deck's Reports view draws the summary, and hmctl report prints a section or saves it as CSV. There is no Control Panel page. Section Counted from Says traffic the message trace Per day and per local domain: incoming, outgoing, failed_incoming, failed_outgoing failures the message trace Per local domain and SMTP status code senders, recipients the message trace The local addresses that sent or received the most, with their failures mailboxes hm_messages The largest mailboxes as they are now: a size, not a history volume the metric history, and the daily per-domain sample Processed, delivered, deferred, bounced, spam and viruses per day, with by_domain rows of spam and viruses storage the same The store's size per day and growth_bytes, with by_domain rows of each domain's size summary all three sources Every section the credential may see, with an omitted list and the reason quota the store Every mailbox with a limit and at least one message, nearest its limit first, as a share of the limit: a share now, not a history countries the metric history and the country counters What a country policy refused, per day; the split by country is since the server last started, not per day The last two are described in QuotaPolicy.md and CountryBlocking.md, not in Reports.md. Parameters. from and to as YYYY-MM-DD, both inclusive, defaulting to the last 30 days and never more than 366; domain, one hosted domain (a domain not hosted here is a 404); top, 1 to 200, default 10; format=csv, refused for summary. In CSV a cell starting with =, +, - or @ is prefixed with an apostrophe. Three things decide whether a report means anything. The message trace is off by default (MessageTraceEnabled=0), and while it is off the four sections counted from it are empty. Processed, delivered, deferred and bounced cannot be given per domain, because those counters carry no domain; spam, viruses and storage can, since schema 6062 added the daily sample in hm_domainsamples, which starts the day it was first taken. And only hosted domains are counted. Authorisation. The administrator password reads everything; every other credential needs both view_configuration and view_message_trace. domainadmin and auditor hold both; helpdesk is refused. A key restricted to named domains sees only those and is refused 403 for another. On volume and storage Reports.md contradicts itself: its Authorisation section refuses them to such a key outright, while its section What cannot be answered, and what it would take (and, for volume, its table of sections under The route) gives a credential restricted to domains the per-domain rows, as the wiki's section 16.6a does. Test both with your own restricted key before a script relies on either. The cost. One report makes at most three grouped queries; the trace read is capped at 100 000 grouped rows and the answer says truncated when it reaches the cap. hmctl report sections hmctl report traffic --from 2026-09-01 --to 2026-09-15 --domain example.com Following one connection live Since 6.3.4 the Deck's Logs page lists the sessions open now and those recently ended, and Follow shows one session's lines as they are written, from an in-memory ring of the last 4,096 log entries that no restart keeps; it needs view_logs. Reading the logs covers following a connection in full, and the log files themselves. Where to read more Documents at v6.3.4: AlertsAndAuditTrail.md, Syslog.md, Reports.md and FollowConnection.md Wiki: Monitoring and Health, sections 16.2a, 16.6a, 16.7a and 16.7b The public documentation: 16.2 Logs on disk On this forum: Monitoring and health for the metrics, the probes, the dashboard and the SNMP agent; Administrator roles for the permissions named here. See also The Control Deck and hMailServer on Linux: what you get and what you do not